Clarifying the Work Preservation/Work Acquisition Dichotomy Under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act: National Labor Relations Board v. International Longshoremen\u27s Association by Rappa, Nancy M.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 35 
Issue 4 Summer 1986 Article 9 
1986 
Clarifying the Work Preservation/Work Acquisition Dichotomy 
Under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the National Labor 
Relations Act: National Labor Relations Board v. International 
Longshoremen's Association 
Nancy M. Rappa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Nancy M. Rappa, Clarifying the Work Preservation/Work Acquisition Dichotomy Under Sections 8(b)(4)(B) 
and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act: National Labor Relations Board v. International 
Longshoremen's Association, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1061 (1986). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss4/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
CLARIFYING THE WORK PRESERVATION/
WORK ACQUISITION DICHOTOMY
UNDER SECTIONS 8(b)(4)(B) AND
8(e) OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT: NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD v. INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIA TION
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act),' one of the
first major federal laws governing the collective bargaining process between
unions and unionized employers, is designed to promote industrial stability.2
I. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69
(1982)) [hereinafter referred to as Wagner Act or NLRA].
2. Section 151 of the Act, in setting forth the statement of policy, declares that
[t]he denial by [some] employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal
by [some] employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent ... of burdening
or obstructing commerce by... (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in
such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from
or into the channels of commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) (bracketed segments added to the Act by Taft-Hartley amendments of
1947).
See also W. OBERER, K. HANSLOWE & J. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR
LAW, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 110 (2d ed. 1979). The authors state
that the Wagner Act was the "offspring of the economic collapse which followed the crash of
1929." Furthermore, the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, enacted as part of the
"New Deal" legislation to tackle the economic collapse, and invalidated in Schechter Poultry
Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), was the forerunner of the Wagner Act in that its
administrative board promulgated decisions and established principles that "anticipated basic
features" of the NLRA. Id. The Wagner Act contained two primary purposes: (1) it was
designed to be the "constitutional hook" of a design to resolve labor disputes that inevitably
interrupt the flow of commerce; and (2) it allegedly would enhance the purchasing power of
workers collaterally through their increased bargaining power and thus, would deal with the
effects of the Depression. Id.
See also Madden, Origin and Early Years of the National Labor Relations Act, 18 HASTINGS
L.J. 571 (1967). Professor Madden, who was appointed by Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins
to the newly-organized National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in 1935, said, in referring to
Senator Wagner, that "[tihe Senator's hope was that his law would make American working
men free ... that it would, in time, make them and their country affluent, by creating a great
mass purchasing power for the products of American industry. He was right on both counts."
Id. at 573. See generally H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 49-53 (1968).
Contra Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 199, 201-02 (1961). Keyserling was Senator Wagner's administrative assistant who
worked with him on the project. He stated in his article that organized industry and the press
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The declared policy of the NLRA is to eliminate substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce "by encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining."' Subsequently, the framers of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act (LMRA) recognized that certain union practices also
tended to obstruct commerce, and amended the NLRA to prohibit certain
union unfair labor practices.4
One type of unfair labor practice engaged in by unions is the secondary
boycott, in which a union exerts economic pressure against an employer who
deals with the union's employer but is not a direct party to the labor dis-
pute.5 As opposed to primary activity, where a union attempts to exert pres-
sure against an employer with which it has a labor dispute,6 secondary
boycotts are attempts by a union to influence a third-party neutral, not di-
rectly involved in the controversy,7 with the "objective of forcing the third
party to bring pressure on the employer to agree to the union's demands."'
The two principal factors determining whether primary or secondary activ-
ity is present are whether the employer against whom the union is exerting
pressure is a truly neutral party, and whether the union is attempting to
affect its relations with its employer or is instead attempting to achieve
were vehemently opposed to the legislation, and that it was even condemned by Walter Lipp-
man who stated that, even if the bill passed, it would not work because "[i]t is preposterous to
put such a burden on mortal men." Id. (citing Lippmann, The Wagner Labor Bill, N.Y. Her-
ald Tribune, Mar. 28, 1935, at 21, col. 1).
3. Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
4. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 151, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1947). See
generally S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8, 22-23, reprinted in I NLRB LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947, at 413-14, 428-29
(1947) [hereinafter cited as I LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947]. The Senate Report re-
counts public hearings given in which testimony was given relating to union activity that had
"unduly impinged upon the rights of individual employees, employers, and the public." Id. at
7, 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947, at 413. The testimony revealed that "proposals
designed to define and correct" many unfair union practices, such as secondary boycotts, had
been presented to the committee. Id.
5. A secondary boycott is a "boycott of one who is not a direct party to the principal
dispute and as a combination to influence a principal by exerting some sort of economic or
social pressure against persons who deal with the principal." S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1960). The report also states that certain judicial determinations revealed the sec-
ondary boycott as being "in the nature of conspiracies in restraint of trade," and several states
had outlawed the activity. Id.
6. NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Eng'rs, 400 U.S. 297 (1971). See also F. BARTOSIC &
R. HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 126 (1977).
7. Goetz, Secondary Boycotts and the LMRA: A Path Through the Swamp, 19 KAN. L.
REV. 651, 653 (1971).
8. Local 825, 400 U.S. at 303. See H.R. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43, reprinted in I
LRMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947, supra note 4, at 547.
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"union objectives elsewhere." 9
Despite the purpose and spirit enunciated in the Wagner Act, it failed to
prohibit the proliferation of secondary union activity. ' Through enactment
of the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 and the Landrum-Griffin amend-
ments of 1959, section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act (NLRA) now imposes restric-
tions on secondary boycott activity by labor unions. " In addition, section
8(e)12 prohibits "hot cargo" agreements whereby a union and an employer
9. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 126. See also Lesnick, The Gravamen
of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962).
10. See R. DERESHINSKY, THE NLRB AND SECONDARY BoYcoTrs 3, 4 (1972). Because
of an intrinsic "Catch-22" effectuated by the conflicting policies of the Wagner Act and the
Norris LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970), (which was not re-
pealed by Congress), unions were removed from antitrust proscriptions and at the same time,
the injunction was limited as a tool in curbing secondary boycotts. R. DERESHINSKY, supra at
2. Consequently, an employer could neither legally accede to union demands nor look to the
courts for injunctive relief. Id. at 3. "Strong unions were able to utilize the boycott as a means
of exerting pressure in order to gain recognition or to gain economic benefits for their mem-
bers." Id. Dereshinsky states that the laissezfaire philosophy perpetuated by the passage of
Norris LaGuardia defined "labor dispute" broadly, and "Congress insured labor's right to
engage in sympathy strikes, secondary boycotts ... and other activities," a policy that was not
eradicated, but rather accommodated, by the passage of the Wagner Act. Id. at 2.
11. Section 8(b)(4)(B), as amended in 1959, states in relevant portion:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufac-
turer, or to cease doing business with any other person ....
Provided, [T]hat nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
61 Stat. 141, as amended, 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B).
When Congress passed the LMRA in 1947 (Taft-Hartley), restrictions on secondary boy-
cotts were incorporated into the Act. The language of § 8(b)(4)(B), enacted in 1947 and
amended in 1959, was the successor clause of § 8(b)(4)(A). See infra note 48 and accompany-
ing text. Professors Bartosic and Hartley succinctly summarize the essence of the secondary
boycott proscriptions encompassed in § 8(b)(4)(B):
The words secondary boycott appear nowhere in the statute. Instead Section
8(b)(4)(B) proscribes specific unlawful means and objectives. To violate the section,
a union must be found to have used an unlawful means to accomplish an unlawful
object. The proscribed means, set forth in the introductory clause to Section 8(b)(4),
are essentially strikes, refusals to handle goods or perform services, or inducement or
encouragement of these activities, as well as restraint of any person. The forbidden
object, set forth in Subsection B, essentially proscribes forcing or requiring any per-
son to cease using or handling the products of another producer or to cease doing
business with any other person. A proviso to Section 8(b)(4)(B) states '[t]hat nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.'
F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 123-24.
12. Section 8(e), enacted in 1959, provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
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agree that the union will not be required to handle goods manufactured or
transferred by another employer with which the union has a dispute or
whom the union considers to be unfair to organized labor.
1 3
The distinction between primary and secondary activity has become criti-
cal in the consideration of collectively-bargained contract provisions known
as "work preservation clauses." 4 When the object of such an agreement is
to benefit members of the bargaining unit, 15 or to maintain work that tradi-
tionally has been performed by bargaining unit employees, 16 courts consider
negotiation and enforcement of work preservation clauses to be primary ac-
tivity falling outside the scope of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) proscriptions. '
7
By contrast, if the agreement tends to secure for the bargaining unit any
work that has never been performed by the union workers,' 8 or tends to
benefit union members in a general sense,' it constitutes what is termed
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, trans-
porting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, any contract or agreement entered into hereto-
fore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible
and void.
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 543 (1959) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982)).
13. A "hot cargo" clause is one which "requires an employer, a neutral party, to refrain
from handling products of another or to cease doing business with another person with whom
the union has a dispute." Western Washington Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v.
Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 230-31, 612 P.2d 436, 440 (1980).
The McClellan Report stated that "[e]ssentially the 'hot cargo' clause is an agreement be-
tween a union and a unionized employer that his employees shall not be required to work on or
handle 'hot goods' or 'hot cargo' being manufactured or transferred by another employer with
whom the union has a labor dispute or whom the union considers and labels as being unfair to
organized labor." S. REP. No. 1139, supra note 5, at 3 (1960). See also F. BARTOSIC & R.
HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 138. Hot cargo clauses, also called "hot goods" clauses, were often
generated as a result of the collective bargaining process, and negotiation of these agreements
maximized union economic pressure. Id.
14. See A. Duie Pyle, Inc. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 772, 775-76 (3d Cir. 1967); see infra note
96 and accompanying text.
15. See A. Duie Pyle, 383 F.2d at 776.
16. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
960 (1968) (union conduct not violative where collective bargaining agreement seeks to pre-
serve "traditional work," and such work extenuates to that "which unit employees have per-
formed and are still performing at the time they negotiated a work preservation clause"). Id.
at 552. In American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n, the court did not rule on "whether ... [a work
preservation clause] can be enforced if the objective is to acquire work which unit employees
had never performed... " Id.
17. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, Local 216 (Associated Pipe & Fitting Mfrs.), 172
N.L.R.B. 35 (1968) (restriction on purchase of prefabricated materials from manufacturers
who did not pay prevailing wage rate illegal).
19. See Meat & Highway Drivers v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Orange
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"work acquisition," 2 and falls within the secondary boycott proscriptions of
the LMRA.
The distinction between lawful work preservation agreements and unlaw-
ful work acquisition agreements has been examined in several recent United
States Supreme Court decisions.2" At issue have been collectively-bargained
rules that reserve to longshoremen particular loading and unloading of con-
tainers that is done within a fifty-mile radius of the port.2 2 The Supreme
Court first addressed the propriety of these agreements in International
Longshoremen's Association v. National Labor Relations Board (ILA-V. 23 It
held that a lawful work preservation agreement requires two elements: first,
the agreement must be designed to preserve work for union members of the
bargaining unit, rather than to achieve some secondary goal; and second, the
employer must be in a position to allocate the work covered by the agree-
ment.2 4 In ILA-I, the Court held that the Board had erroneously defined the
work in dispute, and it remanded the case to the NLRB with instructions
that it reevaluate the rules.25
It was not until National Labor Relations Board v. International Long-
shoremen's Association (ILA-II)26 that the Supreme Court finally put to rest
the ambiguity of the work preservation/work acquisition dichotomy by ap-
proving the two-step analysis formulated in ILA-I. Affirming the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court reviewed
the criteria for work preservation and overruled the NLRB's decision that
the rules on containers were unlawful work acquisition in violation of sec-
tions 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e).2 7 On remand from ILA-I, the Board held that the
rules constituted an unfair labor practice under the Act because of their ef-
Belt Dist. Council of Painters v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Truck Drivers Union,
Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 334 F.2d 539, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
20. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. The Board has continued to place primary
reliance "on the determination that the work in question has never been performed by the
employees." Note, Work Preservation and the Secondary Boycott.- An Examination of the De-
cisional Law Since National Woodwork, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 907 (1970).
21. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). This case "estab-
lished the work preservation doctrine as the main criterion for determining the legality or
illegality of activity under § 8(e)." R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 113. See infra notes
23, 26, 107-08, 166, 198-99, and accompanying text.
22. See Intercontinental Container v. New York Shipping Ass'n (NYSA), 426 F.2d 884
(2d Cir. 1970). This was the first case to litigate the Rules on Containers. See infra note 154-
57 and accompanying text. Cargo loading and unloading is referred to as "stuffing and strip-
ping" in the longshore industry. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
23. 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
24. Id. at 504.
25. Id. at 511.
26. 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985).
27. Id.
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fect on shortstopping truckers28 and traditional warehousers, 29 and deter-
mined that they were illegal work acquisition because they sought to
reacquire longshore work that had been eliminated by intermodal
containerization.30
The Supreme Court held that Congress intended sections 8(b)(4)(B) and
8(e) to reach only secondary activity,3 and it determined that the NLRB
had erred in viewing the extra-unit effect on the shortstoppers as a disposi-
tive indication of unlawful secondary objectives.32 In addition, the Court
stated that the NLRB erred in holding that work that has been eliminated is
never a proper object of work preservation agreements.33
Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by two other members of the Court, 4
maintained that the rules violated the plain language of sections 8(b)(4)(B)
and 8(e). 35 He chastised the majority for failing to recognize that the rules
were an attempt by the union to "extend its influence beyond the unit em-
ployer and the traditional bargaining issues" to appropriate or retain jobs
through impermissible means.36 The dissent asserted that because the rules
permitted longshore labor to obtain work that it had not traditionally per-
formed, the "intent and effect" directly contravened lawful work preserva-
tion principles. Finally, the dissent maintained that the majority had placed
undue emphasis on the work in dispute. Thus, by "refusing to allow a re-
view of the larger economic scene," he contended that the Court managed to
focus solely on the narrow issue of work preservation.37
This Note will suggest that the Supreme Court's decision in ILA-II prop-
erly reinforced the principles applicable to work preservation agreements set
forth by earlier case law. To this end, the Note will examine the enactment
of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). It will evaluate judicial determinations in the
work preservation/work acquisition sphere, and the application of these
28. Id. at 3051. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
29. 105 S. Ct. at 3051. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
30. 105 S. Ct. at 3052. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed the NLRB, stating that the "Board had failed to make any factual finding that the
Rules actually operate to deprive [parties] of any work," and that an agreement that preserves
duplicative work or work that has been technologically "eliminated" per se does not necessar-
ily become "work acquisition." Id. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
31. 105 S. Ct. at 3055.
32. Id. at 3056.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 3059 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 3060.
36. Id. at 3062. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the very conduct the union was engaging
in was the "secondary activity" with which Congress was concerned. Id.
37. Id. at 3063. Justice Rehnquist contended that the Court "hides the ILA's work acqui-
sition under one shell and then forces all attention on the limited question of the union's intent
in bargaining with its employer." Id.
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principles to collectively-bargained Rules on Containers as lawful work pres-
ervation agreements. Finally, the Note will conclude that the Court in ILA-
II reinforced a tenable formula for work preservation that comports with
established principles of national labor law and industrial stability.
I. SECONDARY BOYCOTT AND HOT CARGO PROVISIONS: DELINEATING
THE PRIMARY-SECONDARY Focus
A. Overview of Secondary Boycott Provisions: Tackling the Chameleon
Historically, "primary activity," through which a union exerts pressure
against an employer with which the union is in dispute (the "primary em-
ployer") has been viewed as legitimate union conduct.38 Thus, labor legisla-
tion frequently has attempted to insure that particular union weapons, such
as strikes, boycotts, and picketing, would be used only against primary em-
ployers.39 When the union activity attempts to induce nondealing with an-
other employer (the "secondary employer") by economic threats, however,
the activity "goes beyond the bounds of fair persuasion" and is impermissi-
ble secondary conduct." At common law, courts tended to condemn as sec-
ondary any pressure that targeted a neutral secondary employer for the
purpose of forcing that employer to cease dealing with the primary
employer.4 '
Although the distinction between primary and secondary activity has been
described as not "glaringly bright" and "more nice than obvious,"'42 it is an
attempt to recognize both a labor union's right to pressure its employer in a
primary dispute, and also, to protect a truly neutral party from opprobrious
38. R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS
LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 365 (1984) [hereinafter cited as R. SMITH].
39. Local 825, 400 U.S. at 303.
40. R. SMITH, supra note 38, at 365. See also Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 672 (1961).
41. R. SMITH, supra note 38, at 365.
42. Local 761, 366 U.S. at 673-74 (picketing at gate of neutral subcontractor found unlaw-
ful where union's objective was to involve neutral employees in the dispute). Id. at 670-71.
The test outlined by the court in determining specific objectives that were illegal under
§ 8(b)(4)(B) was that "[e]mployees must be induced; they must be induced to engage in a strike
or concerted refusal; an object must be to force or require their employer or another person to
cease doing business with a third person." Id. at 673. Judge Learned Hand, in International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950) stated that "[lt]he
gravemen [sic] of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the employer who
alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no concern in it. Its aim is
to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that this will induce the em-
ployer to give in to his employees' demands." Id.
1986] 1067
Catholic University Law Review
behavior in disputes not their own.43 The concept of the secondary boycott
is ambiguous and confusing, but it has been described as "a combination to
influence A by exerting some sort of economic or social pressure against per-
sons who deal with A."'  This pressure must be calculated to "[force] the
third party to bring pressure on the employer to agree to the union's
demands.",
45
The use of secondary boycotts by unions became a target of congressional
action.46 Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) of the Act had their genesis in early
judicial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which courts invoked lib-
erally to enjoin unions' coercive pressure.47 Concluding that extensive
abuses proliferated during the Norris-LaGuardia era, a majority in Congress
subsequently enacted the Taft-Hartley proscriptions against union secondary
activity encompassed in section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act.48 Proponents of the
43. F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 124-26. See also Local 825, 400 U.S. at
302-03.
44. St. Antoine, Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo: A Study in Balance of Power, 40 U.
DET. L.J. 189 (1962) (quoting F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 43
(1930)).
45. Local 825, 400 U.S. at 303.
46. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
47. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
Although applications of antitrust legislation to secondary boycott are outside the scope of this
Note, they did play a role in the ultimate shaping and evolution of the secondary boycott
proscriptions as they appear in modern form. For informative background material, see Du-
plex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 445 (1921) (§ 6 of the Clayton Act contains
"nothing... to exempt [a union] or its members from accountability [when] ... they depart
from its normal and legitimate objects and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in
restraint of trade."); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 800-03 (1945)
(history of federal court injunctions against various forms of labor collective activity as unlaw-
ful restraints of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act). A Supreme Court decision in 1941
terminated application of the antitrust law to union secondary activity. See United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941); see also F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 123.
48. This section provides, in relevant part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage [the employees of any employer] to
engage, in a strike or a [concerted] refusal in the course of [their] employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services.., where an object thereof is-
(A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . [to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, or manu-
facturer, or to cease doing business with any other person] ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(A) (1982) (emphasis added; bracketed portions eliminated in 1959
amendments).
See also S. REP. No. 105, supra note 4, at 22, 1 LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947, supra
note 4, at 428. In setting out the proscriptions of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the report
states that
strikes or boycotts, or attempts to induce or encourage such action, are made viola-
[Vol. 35:10611068
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amendments, including the bill's sponsor, specifically indicated that the leg-
islation was aimed only at secondary pressures, and that primary activity
remained permissible.49
B. Application of the Secondary Boycott Provisions
to Union Contract Clauses
The NLRB and the courts have consistently and uniformly invoked these
provisions only against secondary union conduct.50 The Supreme Court has
reinforced this narrow interpretation by refusing to prohibit primary strikes
and picketing notwithstanding a collateral impact on neutral employers.5 "
tions of the Act if the purpose is to force an employer or other person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting... or to cease doing business with any other person.
Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against employer A for
the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business with employer B; nor
would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A because employer A uses or
otherwise deals in the goods of or does business with employer B (with whom the
union has a dispute).
Id.
In enacting § 8(b)(4)(A), Congress
aimed to restrict the area of industrial conflict insofar as this could be achieved by
prohibiting the most obvious, widespread ... dangerous practice of unions to widen
that conflict: the coercion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a
primary labor dispute, through the inducement of their employees to engage in
strikes or concerted refusals to handle goods.
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93, 100
(1958). See generally Lesnick, supra note 9.
49. See National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 623, 624. The Court observed that "[c]om-
mentators of the post Norris-LaGuardia era ... while continuing to deplore the chameleon-
like qualities of the term 'secondary boycott,' agreed upon its central aspect: pressure tacti-
cally directed toward a neutral employer in a labor dispute not his own." Id. at 623. See also 1
C. TELLER, THE LAW GOVERNING LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 145
(1940); S. REP. No. 105, supra note 4, reprinted in I LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1947,
supra note 4, at 407; H.R. REP. No. 510, at 43, reprinted in I LMRA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
1947, supra note 4, at 547.
50. See Lesnick, supra note 9, at 1364.
51. Local 825, 400 U.S. at 303. See also Local 761, 366 U.S. at 672-73. The limitation to
secondary situations was in conformity with the " 'dual congressional objectives of preserving
the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary
labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others from pressures in controver-
sies not their own.'" Id. at 679 (quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 692 (1951)). See also DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951); J.G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958);
Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1952); Piezonki v. NLRB, 219 F.2d 879 (4th
Cir. 1955); NLRB v. General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 968, 225 F.2d 205
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); Local 618, Automotive Petroleum Employees
Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. Local Union No. 55, 218 F.2d 226
(10th Cir. 1954).
See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73
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Accordingly, primary activity will not be transformed into prohibited secon-
dary conduct merely because it has a severe impact on neutral employers.5 2
The Court thus has reinforced that the purpose of section 8(b)(4)(A) was to
shelter only truly neutral employers from the reach of union pressure and
has recognized that section 8(b)(4)(A) was not subject to literal interpreta-
tion.-3 The Court stated that the provision specifically prohibited "the coer-
cion of neutral employers, themselves not concerned with a primary labor
dispute, through the inducement of their employees to engage in strikes or
concerted refusals to handle goods."
5 4
Before the enactment of section 8(e) the enforcement of hot cargo
clauses55 was regulated under section 8(b)(4)(A).5 6 However, both the
NLRB and the courts have had difficulty ascertaining the legality of the en-
forcement of such clauses against secondary parties.57 Courts addressing
hot cargo clauses under section 8(b)(4)(A) permitted contractually-bar-
gained hot cargo agreements to remain outside the reach of the provision.
The first case to come before the Board after the enactment of section
8(b)(4)(A), Teamsters Local 294 (Conway's Express),5" involved a multiem-
ployer agreement that allowed the union to refuse to handle goods of any
employer involved in a labor dispute. The union solicited the assistance of
secondary employees to refuse to handle goods in furtherance of a strike
called against Conway for an alleged breach of Conway's obligations under
another provision of the agreement.59 The NLRB found that when the sec-
ondary employers had consented in advance to the boycott, the employees
were merely exercising their contractual rights." The Board stated that sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(A) did not "prohibit employers from refusing to deal with other
persons, whether because they desire to assist a labor organization in the
HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1112 (1960); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257, 271 (1959).
52. Cox, supra note 51, at 271.
53. See NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951) (fortuitous impact
on neutral employees by primary union strikers not within proscriptions of § 8(b)(4)(A)). See
also F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6, at 124. But see NLRB v. Denver Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688-89 (1951).
54. Sand Door, 357 U.S. at 100.
55. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
56. R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 96.
57. Id. at 97.
58. 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1942), aff'd sub nom. Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.
1952). See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass, 105 N.L.R.B. 740 (1953) (refusal to handle freight per
bargaining contract between union and employer permissible).
59. Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. at 981-82.
60. Id. at 982 (nothing in § 8(b)(4)(A) precluded voluntary execution of "hot cargo" or
"struck work" provisions in the collective bargaining agreement).
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,,61protection of its working standards, or for any other reason. Conse-
quently, Conway established that a hot cargo clause was not a per se viola-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(A) because the section simply did not proscribe any
additional means of inducement of employees by the union.6 2 The case was
affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.63
C. Hot Cargo and Loopholes-The Sand Door Decision
In 1958, the Supreme Court's holding in Local 1976, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners v. NLRB (Sand Door64 effectively overruled Con-
way's Express.65 After reviewing the "checkered career" of the NLRB in
this arena,66 the Court rejected the union's argument that an employer who
has voluntarily entered into a hot cargo contract should not be protected.
The union had contended that the purpose of the statute was to extricate
truly neutral parties from involuntary participation in third party labor dis-
putes, but that this reasoning was inapplicable to voluntary employers.67
The Court noted that the NLRB "has rejected the argument as not comport-
ing with the legislative purpose to be drawn from the statute. "68 It deter-
mined that an employer must have an uncoerced choice whether to support
secondary objectives, regardless of any private contractual arrangement.69
Permitting the union to use section 8(b)(4)(A) to justify activity that would
in effect be impermissible in the absence of the hot cargo clause, the Court
reasoned, would defeat the narrow legislative purpose contemplated by Con-
gress.7' Although the Court stated that while "[a] voluntary employer boy-
cott does not become prohibited activity simply because a hot cargo clause
exists,",71 the existence of the clause will not operate as a defense to an em-
ployer's unfair labor practice charge where the union engages in conduct
prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(A).72
61. Id. (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 982-83 (quoted by R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 98-99). In dissent, Mem-
ber Reynolds chastised the majority for ignoring reality, stating that to the extent the union
contract provisions authorize secondary activity, "they are repugnant to the basic public poli-
cies of the Act." He proposed that "contracts which are repugnant to the Act and which
conflict with this duty of the Board must obviously yield." R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at
98 (quoting Conway's Express, 87 N.L.R.B. at 995).
63. 195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
64. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
65. 87 N.L.R.B. at 972.
66. 357 U.S. at 101-103.
67. Id. at 105.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 100, 105.
71. Id. at 107.
72. Id. at 108.
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D. Response to Excess. The Legislative Intent of
Sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e)
The language of section 8(b)(4) prompted one writer to state that it is
"surely one of the most labyrinthine provisions ever included in a federal
labor statute."73 Although attempting to reduce unfair labor practices in
which unions engaged, section 8(b)(4), in its original form as section
8(b)(4)(A), 7 4 allowed unions to achieve unlawful objectives by circum-
venting the explicit proscriptions of the provision." The Sand Door decision
had demonstrated that a loophole existed in the secondary boycott provi-
sions and, as a result, Congress enacted section 8(e) to proscribe the execu-
tion of hot cargo clauses.7 6 Thus, where the NLRB's decision in Conway's
Express" held that neither the making nor the enforcement of a hot cargo
73. Aaron, supra note 51, at 1113.
74. Section 8(b)(4) prohibited a union from inducing or encouraging "employees of any
employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment." 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii) (1959).
75. The provision did not proscribe illegal objectives where inducement of a single em-
ployee was concerned "since it involved neither a strike nor a concerted refusal to work."
Aaron, supra note 51, at 1113. Additionally, if persons whom the union attempted to "induce
or encourage" did not qualify as "employees," or worked for an organization exempt from the
definition of "employer," the union also could circumvent the provision. Id. Also, pressure
exerted on the secondary employer as opposed to employees, was not prohibited. Id.
See also H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, reprinted in 1 NLRB LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 778-
79 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959], where the Commit-
tee on Education and Labor reported that the inclusion of a hot cargo prohibition in the
amendment would "close a loophole in the present law against secondary boycotts." Because
the essential elements of § 8(b)(4)(A) were the inducement of employees by the union and a
strike or concerted refusal to perform services, an inducement of employees by the union alone
produced no unfair labor practice. Id. at 21, 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, at 779.
The amendment sought to remedy this gap in the legislation.
But see Cox, supra note 51, at 257. Professor Cox stated that one of the propositions of the
amendments was that "strong independent labor unions are essential institutions in American
society." Id.
76. Sand Door, 357 U.S. at 93. For text of § 8(e), see supra note 12; see also H.R. REP.
No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-40 (1959), reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
1959, supra note 75, at 942-44.
A typical hot cargo clause in a collective bargaining agreement would read:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be cause for discharge
if any employee or employees ... refuse to handle unfair goods .... The Union and
its members, individually and collectively, reserve the right to refuse to handle goods
from or to any firm or truck which is engaged or involved in any controversy with
this or any other Union; and reserve the right to refuse to accept freight from, or to
make pickups from or deliveries to establishments where picket lines, strikes, walk-
out or lockout exist.
Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 728, 119 N.L.R.B. 399, 400 (1957).
77. 87 N.L.R.B. at 979.
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clause was illegal, the Supreme Court's decision in Sand Door78 modified this
position by upholding the execution of a contract, but not as a defense to an
unfair labor practice. Therefore, with the enactment of section 8(e), Con-
gress sought to eliminate entirely the execution of hot cargo clauses in col-
lective bargaining agreements.79
The addition of clause (B) to section 8(b)(4) proscribed union activity
"forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person,"80 thereby
removing the interstices in the secondary boycott prohibitions. Moreover, in
response to the Court's decision in NLRB v. International Rice Milling
Co., 81 that construed the word "concerted" to apply to inducement of two or
more employees, the word "concerted" was eliminated in the revision. 2
Inclusion of the primary strike proviso in clause (B) preserved a union's
right to engage in primary activity.8 3 While the intent of Congress in enact-
78. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
79. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 741, supra note 75, at 20-21, reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 778-79; S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 78-80,
reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 474-76: "These 'hot
cargo' contracts have been the subject of much litigation before the Board .... [a] review of
these cases leads to the conclusion that ... generally speaking [a hot cargo contract] does
provide a large loophole in the ban on secondary boycotts." Id. at 80, 1 LMRDA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY 1959, supra note 75, at 476.
80. § 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 150(b)(4)(i)(B) (1982). Although § 8(b)(4)(B) does not ex-
plicitly mention secondary boycotts, the Act "proscribes specific unlawful means and objec-
tives. To violate the section, a union must be found to have used an unlawful means to
accomplish an unlawful objective," for instance, strikes or refusals to handle goods, or "in-
ducement or encouragement of these activities." F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note 6,
at 123-24. An impermissible secondary objective proscribed by the Act would be to force or
require "any person to cease using or handling the products of another producer or to cease
doing business with any other person." Id. at 124.
81. 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
82. See Cox, supra note 51, at 274. "Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley Act forbade
only the inducement of 'employees' to engage in a concerted refusal to work 'in the course of
their employment.' The amendments make it unlawful 'to threaten, coerce or restrain any
person' where an object is to force him to cease doing business with any other person." Id.
83. The proviso reads: "Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be con-
strued to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picket-
ing." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1982).
See H.R. REP. No. 1147, supra note 76, at 38, reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 942, and Senator Kennedy's explanation, 105 CONG. REC.
16,413-14 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGE-
MENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1431-32 (1959) [hereinafter referred to
as 2 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959].
See also Aaron, supra note 51, at 1116. The author states that the net effect of the two
provisions would be that, although "picketing at the site of the primary dispute" would not be
unlawful even if it results in encouraging employees of a secondary employer to cease handling
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ing section 8(e) and revising section 8(b)(4)(B) was to curtail activity that
section 8(b)(4)(A) permitted, 4 this proviso indicated a congressional desire
to remove primary activity from the reach of the Act.85 Thus, "Congress
intended merely to reflect the existing law."'8 6 Likewise, the committee re-
ports and debates concerning section 8(e) strongly indicate that Congress
intended to close a loophole left by the Sand Door decision,87 and the final
hearings before the Senate Select Committee confirmed that the drafters' ob-
jective was to eliminate pervasive secondary conduct by unions.88 Similarly,
the legislative history of section 8(e) confirms that the provision did not ex-
pand the conduct forbidden by section 8(b)(4)(A). 89 Thus, section 8(e) pro-
goods, "intentional inducement of even individual employees of a secondary employer, if ac-
complished away from the site of the primary dispute, will be deemed an unfair labor prac-
tice." Id.
84. See 105 CONG. REC. S1567 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1959) (statement of Sen. Dirksen), re-
printed in 2 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra note 83, at 993:
The administration's bill would eliminate areas of presently permissible secondary
activity which lead to the injury of innocent third parties .... No bill which fails to
contain provisions in these areas of blackmail picketing and the secondary boycott
loopholes can claim to be a truly effective labor reform measure .... The testimony
before the select committee again and again illustrated the method by which certain
unions ... utilized the inadequacies of the present secondary boycott provisions to
force employers to do business with only those people approved by union officials.
Id.
85. H.R. REP. No. 1147, supra note 76, at 38, reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 942 ("The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that
the changes in section 8(b)(4) do not overrule or qualify the present rules of law permitting
picketing at the site of a primary labor dispute.").
86. NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507, 526 (1977) ("This provision
does not eliminate, restrict, or modify the limitations on picketing at the site of a primary labor
dispute that are in existing law.") (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1147, supra note 76, at 38, reprinted
in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 942).
87. 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See, e.g., S. REP. No. 187, supra note 79, at 78-80 (minority
views), reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 474-76; H.R.
REP. No. 741, supra note 75, at 20-21, reprinted in I LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959,
supra note 75, at 778-79. The Report stated that a review of the decisions before the NLRB,
the courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission produced evidence that generally a hot
cargo clause provides "a large loophole" in the prohibition on secondary boycotts, notwith-
standing where such a clause is no defense to an unfair labor practice. S. REP. No. 187, supra
note 79, at 80 (minority views), reprinted in I LMRDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 1959, supra
note 75, at 476. The 1959 amendment proposed to make it an unfair labor practice for a union
to "coerce an employer to enter into such an agreement, or having entered into it, for a union
to coerce the employer to live up to it, or to induce his employees to take economic action to
force the employer to live up to it." Id. The Taft-Hartley amendments merely imposed re-
strictions on the latter. Id.
88. See generally FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON IMPROPER
ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGEMENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1139, supra note 5.
89. See S. REP. No. 187, supra note 79, at 78, reprinted in 1 LMRDA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, 1959, supra note 75, at 474 (ban of secondary boycotts primarily to protect "genu-
inely neutral" employers against economic coercion by union in a labor dispute unrelated to
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hibits agreements with secondary objectives where the enforcement of such
agreements would violate section 8(b)(4).90 Finally, inclusion of the con-
struction and garment industry provisos has been interpreted as "strong con-
firmation that Congress meant that both sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(i)(B) reach
only secondary objectives." 91
II. POST-SECTION 8(E) DEVELOPMENT
A. The Work Preservation Doctrine: National Woodwork Manufacturers
Association v. NLRB
In the years following the enactment of section 8(e), hot cargo provisions
continued to appear in collective bargaining agreements. Some of these pro-
visions included, for instance, struck work and picket line clauses,92 and
most notably, work allocation clauses.93 Because of the broad language of
section 8(e), the latter classification proved to be the most troublesome,94
and the subsequent evolution of a broad interpretation of section 8(e) was to
have a far-reaching impact on the ultimate construction of all hot cargo
clauses.95
Work preservation clauses are contract clauses negotiated by a union or
the neutral employer); see also A. Duie Pyle, 383 F.2d at 775-76; Goetz, supra note 7, at 664
("sweep of § 8(e) no broader than § 8(b)(4)(B)"); R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 114;
Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113
U. PA. L. REV. 1000 (1965); National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 635 ("[a]though the language of
§ 8(e) is sweeping, it closely tracks that of § 8(b)(4)(A), and just as the latter and its successor
§ 8(b)(4)(B) did not reach employees' activity to pressure their employer to preserve for them-
selves work traditionally done by them, § 8(e) does not prohibit agreements made and main-
tained for that purpose").
90. St. Antoine, supra note 44, at 207. The author illustrates the method by which section
8(e) violations are analyzed:
When an agreement is brought into question under section 8(e) ... the test generally
should be whether a union would violate the secondary boycott ban of section
8(b)(4)(B) by inducing employee conduct of the type authorized by the agreement, or
by inducing employees to make their employer do what he has committed himself to
in the agreement. If the inducement would be a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B), the
agreement should be held a violation of section 8(e). But if the agreement does not
sanction a secondary boycott it should be sustained.
Id.
91. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 638. Note the Court's argument concerning the pro-
bative value of the garment industry proviso as a justifiable exception. Id.
92. See, e.g., Truck Drivers, Local No. 413, 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963), enforced in part,
334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
93. See Meat & Highway Drivers v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
94. R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 109. Compare Orange Belt Dist. Council of
Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964) with Machinists Dist. 9 (Greater St.
Louis Automotive Ass'n), 134 N.L.R.B. 1354 (1961), enforced, 315 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
95. R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 113.
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acquired through concerted activity "to protect for [a union's] members, in a
particular collective bargaining unit, the various work assignments that they
have traditionally or historically performed and are currently performing."
9 6
Subsequent to enactment of section 8(e), the decisions had developed guide-
lines to govern lawful work preservation or, alternatively, to identify clauses
that had an impermissible work acquisition objective. 97 The NLRB devel-
oped a test that enabled a union to preserve any work currently being per-
formed if it was traditionally performed by the bargaining unit employees. 98
The Board would not subject contract provisions of this nature to the secon-
dary boycott and hot cargo sanctions of the Act.99 Conversely, the Board
would find an illegal work acquisition objective where bargaining unit em-
ployees sought to obtain work never performed by the unit or for union
members generally," °° but "lost" work could be legitimately secured
again.Ol
Courts of appeals have consistently recognized that although a valid work
preservation clause may have an impact on third parties, that impact does
not necessarily transform the clause into illegal secondary activity.' °2
Although the courts generally have enforced Board orders in determinations
96. Note, supra note 20 at 907. The work preservation doctrine "provides generally that
efforts to preserve work for employees displaced by technological innovation are not unlawful
secondary activities and that union-management contracts with the same purpose are not pro-
scribed 'hot cargo' agreements." International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 890,
892 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also International Bhd. of Teamsters, 197 N.L.R.B. 673 (1972) ("the
provisions do not proscribe agreements or conduct aimed at recapturing or reclaiming for unit
employees work which they previously performed"). Furthermore, courts of appeals have
consistently held that a valid work preservation clause is not transformed into prohibited sec-
ondary activity merely because of its serious impact on third parties. See, e.g., Local No. 742,
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895, 901 (D.C. Cir.); cert denied, 404
U.S. 986 (1971).
97. Note, supra note 20, at 911.
98. Id. See Service & Maintenance Employees' Union (Superior Souvenir Book Co.), 148
N.L.R.B. No. 1033 (1964); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Work-
ers (Armstrong Contracting & Supply Corp.), 148 N.L.R.B. 866 (1964); Milk Wagon Drivers
(Drive-Thru Dairy, Inc.), 145 N.L.R.B. 445 (1963); see also Note, supra note 20, at 911 n.26.
99. Id.
100. See Raymond 0. Lewis (National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement), 148 N.L.R.B.
249 (1964); Milk Drivers Union (Pure Milk Ass'n), 141 N.L.R.B. 1237 (1963), enforced, 335
F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1964); Meat & Highway Drivers (Wilson & Co.), 143 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1963),
enforced in part, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
101. Plumbers & Pipefitters Union (American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n), 154 N.L.R.B. 285
(1964), modified on other grounds sub. nom. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d
815 (1966), aff'd, 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970).
102. See, e.g., Local No. 742, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895,
901 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404
F.2d at 552; NLRB v. Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 380 F.2d 827, 830 (2d Cir.
1967).
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of work preservation,' °3 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
developed a concept known as the "fairly claimable" criteria to resolve work
preservation disputes.'°4 The court recognized that activity which protects
jobs fairly claimable by the union is primary under the provisions, notwith-
standing incidental secondary effects on a neutral employer.105
In 1967, with the work preservation doctrine gaining support from the
"New Frontier NLRB,"' 116 the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of
National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB, 117 that "estab-
lished the ... doctrine as the main criterion for determining the legality or
illegality of activity under section 8(e)."' 8 National Woodwork addressed a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement with a general contractor
which prohibited the handling of premachined doors at the jobsite. ' 9 When
the manufacturer's premachined doors did arrive at the jobsite, the union
ordered its members not to handle the doors." 0 The manufacturer subse-
quently charged the union with violation of section 8(e) for entering into the
will-not-handle provision, and violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) for the unfair
labor practice of "forc[ing] a person to cease using the products of another
manufacturer.""' The NLRB dismissed the charges, concluding that the
provision represented lawful work preservation." 12 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the section 8(e)
103. Note, supra note 20, at 912.
104. Meat & Highway Drivers, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964), enforcing in part, Wilson &
Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1221 (1963) (union's attempt to preserve delivery jobs after most employers
had moved out of region was primary activity, and work allocation clause was lawful); see also
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local Union No. 223 v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (unlawful secondary objective will be found in provision of labor agreement unless it can
be determined that at the time the agreement was signed, the object was preservation of "fairly
claimable" work for the bargaining unit employees); F. BARTOSIC & R. HARTLEY, supra note
6, at 140.
105. Meat & Highway Drivers, 335 F.2d at 713. Cf Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio
& Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
106. R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 116.
107. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
108. R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 113. Accord Houston Insulation Contractors
Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967) (companion case to National Woodwork,- judgment of
NLRB affirmed by Court where Board stated that union's conduct taken to protect work
deprivation traditionally performed by union members and constituted primary activity. The
union members belonged to another local but worked for the same employer).
109. 386 U.S. at 612.
110. Id. at 616.
1ll. Id.
112. Id. at 616-17. The Trial Examiner, in finding that the agreement constituted lawful
work preservation and, thereby, primary activity, stated that the provision
is not concerned with the nature of the employer with whom the contractor does
business nor with the employment conditions of other employers or employees ....
Its purpose is plainly to regulate the relations between the general contractor and his
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charge. In so holding, the court contended that the will-not-handle provi-
sion resembled the product boycott situation condemned in Allen Bradley
Co. v. Union. 113 The court sustained dismissal of the section 8(b)(4)(B)
charge, agreeing that the union's conduct as to the general contractor was a
primary dispute within the clause (B) exemption."
4
The Supreme Court, reiterating that it had consistently refused to inter-
pret section 8(b)(4) to prohibit traditional primary activity, 1 5 affirmed the
Board's decision in upholding the contract provision as lawful work preser-
vation. 16 The Court criticized the court of appeals' reliance on Allen Brad-
ley." ' It distinguished Bradley on the grounds that the union there
entertained secondary objectives because "the cessation of business was be-
ing used tactically, with an eye to its effect on conditions elsewhere." ' 18 The
Court stated that where a boycott is carried on, as in Allen Bradley, "not as a
shield to preserve.., jobs.., but as a sword to reach out and monopolize all
the [jobs] for [union] members," '" 9 secondary boycott proscriptions were
applicable.
The Supreme Court recognized that Congress' apparent desire in enacting
section 8(e) was to remove primary work preservation agreements from the
reach of the provison. 2o The Court stated that to assess whether enforce-
ment of a work preservation clause, such as the will-not-handle agreement in
National Woodwork, was violative of the secondary boycott provisions, an
own employees and to protect a legitimate economic interest of the employees by pre-
serving their unit work.
Id. at 617-18 (emphasis added) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 149
N.L.R.B. at 657).
113. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 618 (citing Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3,
325 U.S. 797 (1945)). In Allen Bradley, a group comprised of the union, various contractors,
and manufacturers attempted to boycott local contractors and manufacturers by barring
equipment manufactured outside a certain delineated area, thereby expanding membership and
broadening employment opportunities for union members. Id. at 800, 803. The Supreme
Court stated that "Congress never intended that unions could, consistently with the Sherman
Act, aid non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods
and services." Id. at 808.
114. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 618.
115. Id. at 626, 627. See also NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951).
116. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 645-46.
117. Id. at 628.
118. Id. at 629. See also Lesnick, supra note 89, at 1017-18.
119. 386 U.S. at 630.
120. Id. at 633-39. See also Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
The Court in National Woodwork stated that its decision in Fibreboard "implicitly recognizes
the legitimacy of work preservation clauses like that involved here." That case involved a
refusal to bargain over contracting-out of work previously performed by bargaining-unit em-
ployees. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 642.
1078 [Vol. 35:1061
Work Preservation/ Work Acquisition Dichotomy
inquiry into "all the surrounding circumstances" '12 1 was required to deter-
mine whether the union's objective was work preservation for the bargain-
ing-unit employees, or "whether the agreements and boycott were tactically
calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere." '122 Since "[t]he touchstone
is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to the labor rela-
tions of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own employees,"' 2 3 and the
union's conduct in the case was predicated upon a refusal to hang prefabri-
cated doors whether or not they were union-made,124 the activity only re-
lated to the work preservation of traditional bargaining-unit tasks,' 25 and a
fortiori, the union objectives were not secondary in nature. 12 6 Both the
NLRB and the courts have continued to abide by the work preservation
criteria as enunciated in National Woodwork. The decisions following Na-
tional Woodwork, however, generally were unable to "clarify the permissible
scope" of work preservation.
12 7
B. A Piece of the Puzzle: The Pipefitters Right To Control Test
Before the Supreme Court's decision in National Woodwork, 128 the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board had formulated a standard known as the
"right to control" doctrine. 129 Essentially, this concept states that to be des-
ignated as a primary employer for purposes of a labor dispute, an employer
must be in a position to allocate the work at issue.' 3 ° The doctrine was
121. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644. The Court elaborated on what it perceived to be
"surrounding circumstances." These "might include the remoteness of the threat of displace-
ment by the banned product or services, the history of labor relations between the union and
the employers who would be boycotted, and the economic personality of the industry." Id. at
644 n.38. See generally Comment, Subcontracting Clauses and Section 8(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 62 MICH. L. REv. 1176, 1185-99 (1964).
122. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644.
123. Id. at 645.
124. Id. at 646.
125. Id.
126. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547, 552 (8th Cir. 1968). See also
Note, supra note 20, at 915. The author refused to impute a "broader holding" to the Supreme
Court ruling in National Woodwork simply because the factual situation disclosed that the
disputed task had been performed by the union workers at the jobsite "at least customarily."
Id. at 915 n.42.
127. See Note, Work Recapture Agreements and Secondary Boycotts: ILA v. NLRB, 90
HARv. L. REV. 815, 821-22 (1976).
128. 386 U.S. 612 (1976).
129. See Note, supra note 20, at 918. "From the Board's point of view, if an employer
lacks the power of control necessary to satisfy the union's demands, he is a neutral secondary
employer, since the union must be trying to influence the person that can meet its demands.
This latter person, with control over the situation, is thus the primary employer." Id
130. A classic illustration of this doctrine is provided in Ohio Valley Carpenters v. NLRB,
339 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir. 1964), where the court states: "[Ilf a union demands that a
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developed and implemented by the NLRB prior to the Court's decision in
National Woodwork. ''
The right to control doctrine has been maligned for unequivocally ignor-
ing the reality of the primary-secondary distinction because the fact that an
employer possesses the "right to control" may be purely fortuitous and with-
out causal connection to the situation.' 32 Where the immediate employer
may not necessarily be the primary employer under the right to control doc-
trine, 133 the enforceability of the agreement would be dependent upon "for-
tuitous business arrangements [having] no significance so far as the evils of
the secondary boycott are concerned."' 34 Conversely, the rights of the bar-
gaining unit employees under a valid work preservation agreement are
equally affected regardless of the employer's relationship to the employees.
National Woodwork did not, however, reach the legitimacy of the right to
control doctrine as either a dispositive or probative factor in ascertaining the
primary employer for lawful work preservation.' 3 5 Although the doctrine
contractor do something he is powerless to do except by ceasing to do business with somebody
not involved in the dispute, it is manifest that an object of the union is to induce this cessation
of business."
131. See, e.g., Local 1066, International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggin Terminals, Inc.),
137 N.L.R.B. 45 (1962); Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, 137 N.L.R.B. 828
(1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); International
Longshoremen's Ass'n (Board of Harbor Commissioners), 137 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962), en-
forced, 331 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1964) (where "[tihe employer, under economic pressure by a
union is without power to resolve the underlying dispute, such employer is the secondary or
neutral employer and ... the employer with power to resolve the dispute is the primary em-
ployer." 137 N.L.R.B. at 1182).
132. See Note, supra note 20, at 920. Board Member Gerard A. Brown, who has dissented
in all the Board cases involving the right of control doctrine, "has taken the position that right
of control should not be given determinative weight, but ... should be just one of the factors
considered in any particular case." Id. Hence, Member Brown felt that the doctrine's proba-
tive force would be insufficient where the union's agreement and attendant action have lawful
work preservation objectives. Id. Contra R. DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 119. The author
asserts that the right of control test makes the status of the parties ascertainable. Cf
Feldacker, Subcontracting Restrictions and the Scope of Sections 8(b)(4)(A) and 8(e) of the
NLRA, 17 LABOR L.J. 170, 182-185 (1966); Comment, "Hot Cargo" Clauses in Construction
Industry Labor Contracts, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 99, 109-11 (1968).
133. This would occur, for instance, where a general contractor arrives on a jobsite subse-
quent to a collective bargaining arrangement.
134. Note, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77 YALE L.J. 1401, 1416 (1968)
(quoting NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. at 693 (Douglas, J., dis-
senting)). "The effects upon the general contractor (when the general contractor is removed
from the direct confrontation but is aware of the work preservation agreement) are thus ancil-
lary to a primary dispute with the immediate employer vindicating bargaining unit concerns."
Id. at 1417. See also Journeymen Local 5, 137 N.L.R.B. 828, 836 (1962) (dissenting opinion of
Member Brown).
135. National Woodwork ostensibly did not alter the right of control doctrine because it
was not required to reach the issue; the general contractor had undisputed "control" and this
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had received a mixed reception in the courts, both the courts and the NLRB
generally continued to apply the doctrine to some degree in determining the
primary employer where work preservation clauses were implicated.'
3 6
In 1977, with its ruling in National Labor Relations Board v. Enterprise
Association of Pipefitters, 137 the Supreme Court affirmatively decided the
right to control question. The Court in Pipefitters affirmed the work preser-
vation logic espoused by National Woodwork 138 and confirmed that the issue
was stipulated by the parties. See also Note, supra note 20, at 922. The author suggests that
the "National Woodwork test was designed solely to facilitate a determination as to whether
particular activity has a valid work preservation objective," strengthened by the "surrounding
circumstances" analysis of the decision. Hence, where these factors relate only to work preser-
vation, they are not applicable in determining whether the employer is in a position to adhere
to the union's demands. Id. It is further suggested that a "sound reason for limiting the
doctrine" rests with a contractor's insulation from union economic sanctions merely because
such employer may not possess the requisite "right to control," but in effect, should be held
accountable for the bargaining unit demands. Id. at 922-23.
136. International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Board of Harbor Comm'rs), 137 N.L.R.B. 1178
(1962), enforced as modified, 331 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1964); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Coun-
cil (Cardinal Indus.), 144 N.L.R.B. 91 (1963), enforced, 339 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1964); Journey-
men, Local 636 v. NLRB, 278 F.2d 858 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Journeymen, Local 5 v. NLRB, 321
F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921 (1963); NLRB v. Pipefitters, Local 638, 285
F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1960); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 823 (8th Cir. 1966).
The Supreme Court recognized that "[g]enerally, the Courts of Appeals did not treat the
Board's control test as a per se rule, reasoning instead that the absence of the right to control
the work sought is strong evidence that the objective of the economic pressure being applied by
the union is to affect someone other than the struck employer." Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 527
n.15.
See also George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d 323, 327 (4th Cir. 1973) ("Despite the
union's opposing contention, the Board has not exalted right-to-control as per se the conclu-
sive indicium of a secondary boycott .... [but has] obediently followed [National Woodwork's]
instruction, according weight to all existing and relevant circumstances."); Associated Gen.
Contractors v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438 (9th Cir. 1975) ("union's right to enforce a work
preservation clause against an employer may extend only to work which is his to assign"). For
cases rejecting the right of control doctrine, see NLRB v. Local 164, International Bhd. of
Elec. Workers (Ridgewood Bd. of Educ.), 158 N.L.R.B. 838, enforcement denied, 388 F.2d
105 (3d Cir. 1968); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1968); Local
No. 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906 (D.C. Cir. 1970). In the Ridge-
wood case, the right of control was determined to be only one factor in considering the legality
of the agreement, and if the dispute involved work preservation only and the union's effort to
enforce against a contracting employer, no illegal secondary objectives would be found. R.
DERESHINSKY, supra note 10, at 118.
The NLRB continued to apply the right of control doctrine to explicate primary-secondary
situations in labor disputes in the following: International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators,
Local 12, 193 N.L.R.B. 40 (1971); Enterprise Ass'n, Local 638, 183 N.L.R.B. 516 (1970);
Local 742, Carpenters, 178 N.L.R.B. 351 (1969); Local 636, Plumbers & Pipefitters, 177
N.L.R.B. 189 (1969); Pipefitters, Local No. 120, 168 N.L.R.B. 991 (1967).
137. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
138. 429 U.S. at 510. The Court stated: "Among other things, it is not necessarily a viola-
tion of § 8(b)(4)(B) for a union to picket an employer for the purpose of preserving work
traditionally performed by union members even though in order to comply with the union's
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turned on the National Woodwork criteria for determining primary-secon-
dary conduct. 139 Nonetheless, the Court struck down a circuit court deci-
sion that had rejected the right to control test of the NLRB as violative of
the principles of National Woodwork. 1  The Court further illuminated the
National Woodwork position by stating that although a work preservation
clause may be valid under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), this does not fore-
close a possibility of further illegal activity violative of sections 8(b)(4)(B)
and 8(e) should the union engage in impermissible secondary activity to en-
force the clause. Under the Sand Door rule,14 which was never rejected, the
Court stated that a valid contract could not immunize conduct otherwise
prohibited by the provisions. Thus, the work preservation agreement and its
enforcement in National Woodwork was legitimate because the union did not
engage in otherwise impermissible activity.'
42
In examining the "surrounding circumstances" criteria, the Supreme
Court in Pipefitters accepted the NLRB's position that it had properly con-
sidered all factors in reaching a conclusion that the union's conduct was
secondary as to the employer.1 43 The Court rejected the court of appeals'
conclusion that the Board had historically applied the right to control test
mechanically, and not as a contributing factor, to the "surrounding circum-
stances" guideline. 1" The Court held that although the Board or the appel-
late court could weigh the circumstances differently, the Board's assessment
of each of the factors was not "a departure from the totality-of-the-circum-
stances test."'
' 45
In dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that the right to control doctrine
contradicted National Woodwork's recognition that a work preservation
agreement is lawful under the Act's provisions.14 6 His reasoning centered
demand the employer would have to cease doing business with another employer." Id. (quot-
ing National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 612).
139. 429 U.S. at 511.
140. Id. at 521. The court of appeals held that the right of control test was "invalid as a
matter of law" because it failed to comport with National Woodwork's "all the surrounding
circumstances" test. Id. at 521-23.
141. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
142. 429 U.S. at 519-20. The Court stated that the conclusion reached by the court of
appeals "ignores the substance of our decision in Sand Door." Although a work preservation
clause may be "valid in its intendment," applying the provision outside the primary relation-
ship to neutral employers is illegal under the Act. Id. at 521 n.8.
143. 429 U.S. at 522-23.
144. 429 U.S. at 523 n.ll. See George Koch Sons, Inc., Local 438, United Pipe Fitters,
201 N.L.R.B. 59, 64 (1973) ("Board has... continue[d] to eschew a mechanical application of
its control test in order to ascertain whether the struck employer is truly an offending
employer").
145. 429 U.S. at 524.
146. Id. at 537 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "Since the purpose of the union's pressure was,
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on the fact that, regardless of the right to control evaluation, the real target
of the union's pressure should be identified because the injury to the employ-
ees was identical under all the circumstances. 14 7 In addition, Justice Bren-
nan maintained that the subcontractor was not the neutral employer
contemplated by Congress, 148 and that the fact that the general contractor
made the decision was extraneous to the union. 149
Since the Pipefitters decision, courts of appeals have continued to approve
the Board's implementation of the doctrine in the work preservation area.
They have reinforced the use of the test as a relevant factor in the "totality of
circumstances in evaluating the unions' objectives."' 5 °
C Extending Work Preservation: The Rules on
Containerization and ILA-I
The Court's struggle to delineate the primary-secondary distinction in the
work preservation arena has been complicated even further by the introduc-
tion and evolution of modem technology affecting traditional bargaining-
by the Board's own finding, work preservation, and since National Woodwork holds that work
preservation is a legitimate primary objective, the only possible conclusion on this record is
that the pressure here was primary, and not prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(B)."
Accord Brief for the United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe-
fitting Industry, Amicus Curiae at 8-9, NLRB v. Enterprise Ass'n of Pipefitters, 429 U.S. 507
(1977). Because the Board's finding should have been "based on an evaluation of all the sur-
rounding circumstances" to target the union's objective, the Board's reasoning "completely
overlooks the point that ... the union's action did not carry with it any inherent indicia of
secondary motivation. Indeed, this is a situation where the employees' conduct is presump-
tively primary." Id. Counsel asserted that evidence of a primary motive inheres in the con-
firmed lawfulness of a work preservation agreement by the Supreme Court. Id.
147. 429 U.S. at 539-41.
148. Id. at 538.
149. Id. at 539.
150. Electro-Coal Transfer Corp. v. Locals 1418 & 1419, International Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 591 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1979) (considered the employer's right to control over the work
as a relevant circumstance in the totality of circumstances test, even though this case dealt
with a product boycott). See also International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1575 v.
NLRB, 560 F.2d 439, 447 (1st Cir. 1977) (Board's discretion to assign different weight to the
right to control test than did the court of appeals was not a departure from the totality of
circumstances test outlined in National Woodwork.). The court stated that the Pipefitters deci-
sion illustrated that work preservation does not necessarily insulate a union from unlawful
secondary activity, and that the range of work preserved under the work preservation doctrine
had significantly narrowed since the Pipefitters decision. Id. (citing Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 528
n.16)); Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1978) (Board's right of con-
trol test not a per se evaluation, and the surrounding circumstances must be examined by the
Board). Cf ILA-II, 105 S. Ct. at 3053 n. 12 (the "rationale of the third major precedent in this
area, [Pipefitters] is not directly implicated in this case . . . [because] the Pipefitters test is
satisfied here").
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unit strongholds. 5 ' A major dispute has centered around the increasing
effect of intermodal containerization, 152 and the concomitant handling by
the courts of collectively-bargained Rules on Containers designed to mitigate
the reduction in longshore work engendered by such containerization.' 5 3
151. The implications of automation and technological innovation as factors in job dis-
placement have become a pressing concern to courts, legislatures, and the bargaining parties,
and the solutions are not readily ascertainable.
[I]n this area of automation and onrushing technological change, no problems in the
domestic economy are of greater concern than those involving job security and em-
ployment stability. Because of the potentially cruel impact upon the lives . . . of
working [people] ... these problems have understandably engaged the solicitous at-
tention of government, of responsible private business, and particularly of organized
labor.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 225 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Additionally, the 87th and 88th Congress had taken a particular interest in the job displace-
ment dilemma resulting from the proliferation of technological progress. See, e.g, National
Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 641 n.36: "Many achievements in attempting to overcome the difficul-
ties created by radical technological change can and should be accomplished through collective
bargaining and joint labor-management efforts .... Even greater concentration by labor and
management on these problems is needed in the period ahead." Id. (quoting Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Unemployment and the Impact ofAutomation of the House Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961) (statement of Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg).
See also Ross, Waterfront Labor Response to Technological Change: A Tale of Two Unions,
21 LABOR L.J. 397, 398 n.7 (1970). Ross contends that intermodal containerization is the
"single most important innovation in ocean transport since the steamship displaced the
schooner." Id.
152. In ILA-I, the Supreme Court explained that
Containers are large, reusable metal receptables, ranging in length from 20 to 40 feet
and capable of carrying upwards of 30,000 pounds of freight, which can be moved on
and off an ocean vessel unopened. Container ships are specially designed and con-
structed to carry the containers, which are affixed to the hold. A container can also
be attached to a truck chassis and transported intact to and from the pier like a
conventional trailer.
447 U.S. at 494.
With the advent of containerization, much of the on-pier work involving transfer of loose, or
"break-bulk," cargo has diminished. This work has been reduced even further by the availabil-
ity of containers to shippers and consolidators for off-pier loading. ILA -I, 447 U.S. at 495-96.
"A freight consolidator combines the goods of various shippers into a single shipment at its
own off-pier terminal and delivers the shipment to the pier." Id. at 496 n.8.
For a useful and informative odyssey through the union response to containerization, and
the emergence of containerization as a "real issue" in the collective bargaining sphere, see
Ross, supra note 151, at 397. The author points out the essential factual criteria governing the
atmosphere during technological change during the evolution of intermodal containerization
on the East and West Coast waterfronts, and the corresponding conflicts and philosophies that
developed between the two major longshore unions (the ILA and the ILWU). The corre-
sponding jurisdictional controversies that resulted from ILA collective bargaining processes
are particularly noteworthy. Id.
See also Ullman, The Role of the American Ocean Freight Forwarder in Intermodal, Con-
tainerized Transportation, 2 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 625, 627 (1971); Note, Containerization and
Intermodal Service in Ocean Shipping, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1969).
153. For a history of the evolution of the present rules, see ILA-I, 447 U.S. at 496-99. For
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first adjudicated in the con-
tainerization area with its 1970 decision in Intercontinental Container Trans-
port Corp. v. New York Shipping Association. 15' Although the case was
brought under the Sherman Act, 155 the court held that lawful work preser-
vation agreements were "within the area of proper union concern" as enun-
ciated by National Woodwork, 156 and thus were not violative of the antitrust
laws. 
5 7
Following the decision in Intercontinental Container, two off-pier con-
solidators filed charges against the New York Shipping Association and the
International Longshoremen's Association, alleging that the Rules on Con-
tainers were unlawful secondary boycott agreements.' 5 8 The NLRB held
that the union had engaged in a secondary boycott by attempting to secure
work traditionally performed by consolidators. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed that finding in International Longshoremen's Association v.
NLRB (Conex). '59 The court concluded that the work in dispute was the
purposes of this Article, it is important to note only the final version of the rules incorporated
in the 1974 agreement between the Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations
(CONASA) and the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). The Court in ILA-I
succinctly summarizes this version:
[U]nder the final version of the Rules . . . if containers owned or leased by the
shipping companies are to be stuffed or stripped locally by anyone other than the
employees of the beneficial owner of the cargo, that work must be done at the piers
by ILA labor. FSL containers [full shippers' loads, or those owned by one shipper or
consignee] that are transported intact to or from the beneficial owner or that are
warehoused locally for 30 days, and consolidated containers [holding goods belong-
ing to more than one consignee] coming from or bound for points outside the local
area, do not have to be stuffed or stripped by ILA members.
447 U.S. at 499. See also Appendix, 447 U.S. at 513-22, for the text of the rules. The penalty
imposed for infraction is stiff-"liquidated damages of $1,000 per container." Id. at 519. A
summary of the present rules is also outlined in the NLRB decision, 266 N.L.R.B. 230, 233
(1983).
154. 426 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1970).
155. The Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982)).
The charging party (International Container) asserted that the New York Shipping Associa-
tion (NYSA) and the ILA entered into a "combination and conspiracy" in executing and
enforcing a collective bargaining agreement, which reserved to the ILA the work of unloading
and loading containers in the New York port area, and further perpetrated this conspiracy by
levying fines on violators. 426 F.2d at 886.
156. 426 F.2d at 887.
157. Id. The Court made an additional finding that the NYSA agreement was within the
labor antitrust exemption where the union acted alone, and not in combination, in its self-
interest, and the rules fell within the ambit of a labor dispute where "containerization has for
many years been a bitterly contested issue in the negotiations." 426 F.2d at 888. Cf Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
158. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n, and Consolidated Express, Inc., and Twin
Express, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 956 (1975).
159. 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (The court of appeals
1986] 1085
Catholic University Law Review
off-pier stuffing and stripping of containers, 160 rather than the unloading and
loading of ships. Consequently, the court found that the ILA was engaged in
work acquisition, rather than work preservation, and it struck down the
rules as impermissible secondary activity.'61 In a companion case arising in
the First Circuit, in ILA v. NLRB, 162 the court of appeals similarly found
that the union, in seeking to displace nonunion employees at a consolidator's
facilities, manifested an interest not only in work preservation, but also in
union organization of the consolidators. 163 The court stated that in itself
this finding was sufficient to render inapposite the National Woodwork 164
work preservation exemption to secondary pressure.
165
The containerization issue was addressed squarely by the Supreme Court
in 1980, when it decided National Labor Relations Board v. International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA-I),166 consolidating cases brought before
the Board as a result of the Conex decision. 167 The Supreme Court rein-
forced the propriety of primary union activity and reiterated the criteria an-
nounced in both National Woodwork 16' and Pipefitters 169 in determining
exactly what constituted a lawful work preservation agreement. 170 In apply-
ing the doctrine, the Court reaffirmed that emphasis must be placed on the
work in dispute."'7 The Court noted, however, that the identification of the
distinguished its decision in Intercontinental Container, 537 F.2d at 708 n. 1, as one arising in
an antitrust context.).
160. 537 F.2d at 711. A definition of "stuffing" and "stripping" appears in the courts of
appeals' decision. Id. at 708. See also International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 221 N.L.R.B. at
969.
161. 537 F.2d at 712.
162. 560 F.2d 439 (1st Cir. 1977).
163. Id. at 445.
164. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
165. 560 F.2d at 443-46.
166. 447 U.S. 490 (1980).
167. 537 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Dolphin Forwarding, 236 N.L.R.B. 525 (1978);
Associated Transp., 231 N.L.R.B. 351 (1977).
168. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
169. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
170. 447 U.S. at 504. The Court stated that "a lawful work preservation agreement must
pass two tests: First, it must have as its objective the preservation of work traditionally per-
formed by employees represented by the union. Second, the contracting employer must have
the power to give the employees the work in question-the so-called 'right-of-control' test of
Pipefitters." Id.
171. 447 U.S. at 506-07. In this case, the Court indicated that the Board's focus on the
work in dispute as "the off-pier stuffing and stripping of containers" was erroneous. Id. at 506,
508. The Court added that "[t]he effect of work preservation agreements on the employment
opportunities of employees not represented by the union, no matter how severe, is of course
irrelevant to the validity of the agreement so long as the union had no forbidden secondary
purpose to affect the employment relations of the neutral employer." Id. at 507 n.22 (citing
Pipefitters, 429 U.S. at 510, 526).
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work in dispute in National Woodwork and Pipefitters required "no subtle
analysis." Yet, agreements emanating from displacement of traditional jobs
or technological innovation, such as those in ILA-, required a more difficult
analysis.172 The Court stated that this analysis should be such as to permit
the collective bargaining process to address sufficiently the threats to tradi-
tional jobs posed by technological change. 1 73 Conversely, the Court main-
tained that the work preservation doctrine must be tempered with an
attitude of accommodation by union workers, who must not present an in-
transigent response to such change.
174
The Court stated that, while the analysis should take into consideration
"all the surrounding circumstances,"' 7" it should focus on the work of bar-
gaining unit employees, evaluating the work both before the innovation and
"as the agreement proposes to preserve it. ' 176 Hence, in focusing on the
work of the truckers and warehousers after the introduction of containeriza-
tion, the Court concluded that the Board in ILA-I effectively foreclosed any
possibility of preserving longshore work. 177 It stated that the Board's rea-
soning was seriously defective because the very reason for negotiation of the
rules was the fact that longshoremen never had performed this particular
work away from the pier.17 8 Consequently, the Court agreed with the court
of appeals that, using the Board's analysis, the "work preservation doctrine
is sapped of all life."'
179
The Court in ILA-I then stated that the second step of the work preserva-
tion analysis involved an examination of the method used by the parties to
preserve the work in the face of a massive technological change that elimi-
nated the necessity for longshore handling of cargo in particular intermedi-
172. 447 U.S. at 505.
173. Id. at 505 (citing National Woodwork 386 U.S. at 641-42). Contra ILA-I, 447 U.S. at
526 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In referring to the ILA rules as a "gross perversion of the
work preservation doctine," id. at 526, the Chief Justice likened the ILA assertions to "echoes
of the complaints of stablekeepers and harness manufacturers when the automobile first gained
wide acceptance." Id. at 526 n.2; but see Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203 (1964): "One of the primary purposes of the Act is to promote the peaceful settlement of
industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influence of
negotiation." Id. at 211.
174. 447 U.S. at 506.
175. Id. at 507 (quoting National Woodwork 386 U.S. at 644). See supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
176. 447 U.S. at 507.
177. Id. at 507-08.
178. Id. at 508. The Court carefully clarified its holding. It did not rule that the agree-
ment was lawful work preservation, but that "the Board's definition of the work in controversy
was erroneous as a matter of law." Id. at 511 n.26. Hence, the case was remanded to the
Board for further determination.
179. Id. at 508 (quoting 613 F.2d at 909).
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ate stages.' 80 The Court asserted that this analysis compels an evaluation of
the relationship between the work the union attempted to preserve and the
traditional work it had performed.1 8 ' Hence, the Court stated that the argu-
ments posed by the parties, such as whether the stuffing and stripping of
cargo is "functionally equivalent" to traditional longshore duties or, whether
the work formerly done by ILA labor at the pier has been effectively elimi-
nated by fundamental changes precipitated by containerization, must be re-
solved on remand to the Board.1 8 2 Thus, the Court instructed the Board to
consider the work at issue from the proper perspective, and subsequently, to
apply the National Woodwork criteria to determine whether the rules consti-
tuted a lawful work preservation agreement.
1 8
1
On remand to the NLRB,'1 4 the Board reviewed the decision of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) as applied to consolidators,1 8 5 shortstopping
truckers,1 8 6 and traditional warehousers.'8 7 It agreed with the ALJ's con-
clusion that under the National Woodwork criteria 8 8 the rules had a lawful
work preservation objective as applied to consolidators. 1 9 The Board also
focused on the work in dispute and supplied a definition where it found that
the ALJ had failed to do so. 9 ' But the Board found that the rules had an
illegal work acquisition objective when applied to shortstopping truckers and
warehousers, and concluded that the ALJ had improperly focused on the
"economic character" of the truckers' and warehousers' industry and on
work historically performed by such employees.' 9 ' The Board also found
180. Id. at 509.
181. 447 U.S. at 510. The Court said that "the result [would] depend on how closely the
parties have tailored their agreement to the objective of preserving the essence of the tradi-
tional work patterns." Id. at 510 n.24.
182. Id. at 510-11. The Court stated that "[tihese questions are not appropriate for initial
consideration," and "[s]ince the Board has not had an opportunity to consider these questions
in relation to a proper understanding of the work at issue we will not address them here." Id.
at 511.
183. Id.
184. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 266 N.L.R.B. 230 (1983).
185. Id. at 235. For a summary of definitions germane to the containerization cases and
the longshore industry in general, see id. at 241.
186. Id. at 235.
187. Id. at 236.
188. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
189. 266 N.L.R.B at 235-36.
190. Id. at 236. The Board defined the work in controversy as "the initial loading and
unloading of cargo within 50 miles of a port into and out of containers owned or leased by
shipping lines having a collective bargaining relationship with the ILA." Id. Counsel for Re-
spondent International Longshoremen's Association in ILA -II commented that the Board "fil-
led what it considered to be a lacuna in the AL's decision." Brief in Opposition to Petitioner
at 6 n.7, ILA-II, 105 S. Ct. at 3045.
191. 266 N.L.R.B. at 236.
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that it was unnecessary to rely on the ALJ's findings that the rules were
work acquisition because they sought to "compensate longshoremen for
losses at the expense of inland employees whose jobs did not derive from
containerization," and that the ALJ had not conformed to the Supreme
Court's directive to focus on the work of the bargaining-unit employees.192
Nonetheless, the Board reached virtually the same conclusion, that the rules
represented unlawful work acquisition. It reasoned that, with the advent of
containerization, some of the work traditionally performed by the longshore-
men at the pier and historically duplicated by truckers and warehousers ef-
fectively had been eliminated.193 While the ALJ's focus had been on newly
created work, the Board determined that work duplicated by the ILA after
containerization "no longer exist[ed] as a step in the cargo handling
process."1 94
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the
Board's order' 95 and found that the rules did not deprive shortstopping
truckers or traditional warehousers of work.' 96 Additionally, the court
found that a collective bargaining agreement regarding duplicative or tech-
nologically eliminated work did not, in itself, require a finding that the
agreement constituted unlawful work acquisition.
1 97
III. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. INTERNATIONAL
LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION: CLARIFYING THE CONFUSION
On a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the
dispute came before the Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v.
International Longshoremen's Association (ILA-Il). 198 In a six to three deci-
sion written by Justice Brennan, the Court upheld the collectively-bargained
Rules on Containers, 9 9 originally litigated in Conex,2° as applied to the
192. Id. at 236.
193. Id. at 237.
194. Id.
195. American Trucking Ass'n v. NLRB, 734 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1984).
196. Id. at 978-80.
197. Id.
198. 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985).
199. The Rules on Containers at issue in this case are "substantively identical to the Rules
printed as an Appendix to ILA-I .... [T]hese Rules have been negotiated between the ILA
and the Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations [CONASA], a multiemployer bar-
gaining group encompassing the marine shipping companies in 36 major ports on the Atlantic
and Gulf coasts." Id. at 3048 n.2. See also Ross, supra note 151, for a comprehensive analysis
of comparative collective bargaining tactics of the West Coast union, the International Long-
shoremen and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU).
200. 537 F.2d 706. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
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shortstopping truckers and traditional warehousers.2 °1 After reviewing the
congressional intent behind sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), the Court reempha-
sized that National Woodwork principles comported with the congressional
desire to forbid only secondary objectives.2"2 Further, the Court stated that
the reach of section 8(e) included lawful work preservation agreements be-
cause such clauses are used as a "shield" to protect traditional jobs, not as a
"sword" to achieve secondary objectives,2 ° 3 and not to "reach out to monop-
olize jobs" of nonlongshore labor.2"
The Supreme Court noted that when the ALJ, the NLRB, and the court
of appeals ascertained a lawful work preservation objective in the rules, their
consideration of the extra-unit effects of such an agreement on shortstoppers
and warehousers was erroneous.20 5 The Court reasoned that not only was
their finding insufficient to demonstrate an unlawful work acquisition objec-
tive, but absent additional union motivation to "reach out and monopolize"
when ILA jobs were not threatened, the reasoning was inapposite.2"6 Addi-
tionally, the Court held that the Board's finding that technologically elimi-
nated or duplicative work transformed a work preservation clause into an
illegal agreement was misplaced.20 7 Indeed, not only was elimination not
dispositive to condemn work preservation agreements, but, as a factor of
analysis, it "provides the very premise for such agreements."2 The Court
further indicated that the relevant inquiry for work preservation was
whether the union engaged in primary or secondary activity. The preemi-
nent consideration, therefore, was whether the union's efforts were directed
toward the labor relations of an employer of the bargaining unit or "tacti-
cally calculated" toward achieving objectives outside the primary employer-
employee relationship by affecting the business relations of a neutral
employer.20 9
201. 105 S. Ct. 3045 (1985).
202. Id. at 3053.
203. Id. at 3053-54 (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 630). For a succinct sum-
mary of the controlling authority in work preservation in relation to National Woodwork, see
International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 266 N.L.R.B. at 248.
204. 105 S. Ct. at 3054 (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 630-31).
205. Id. at 3056.
206. Id. (quoting National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 630).
207. Id. at 3056-57.
208. Id. See Brief in Opposition to Petitioner at 8, ILA-II. Counsel asserted that the court
of appeals disposed of the Board's "elimination" argument because contending "that work
rendered unnecessary by technological change may not be properly preserved in a collective
bargaining agreement ...flies in the face of National Woodwork." Id. (quoting American
Trucking Ass'n v. NLRB, 734 F.2d at 979).
209. 105 S. Ct. at 3057. Counsel referred to the Board's "fact-finding" process-where the
rules do not transfer any off-pier work, and the Board failed to find that off-pier work was
transferred to the ILA, it "reached a conclusion of work acquisition without the acquisition of
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Consequently, the Court found that the ALJ, the Board, and the court of
appeals all supported the conclusion that, absent "any significant ILA inter-
est in the labor relations of the class of employers boycotted by the
Rules," 21 the rules sought to preserve, and not to acquire, traditional work.
In noting that the rules were motivated by the justifiable desire of longshore-
men to preserve jobs despite the diminishing cargo work at the pier, the
Court indicated that the rules clearly evidenced a primary objective.21" ' This
finding, combined with a positive answer to the right to control test, should
have precluded the additional inquiry by the Board into extra-unit effects
imposed on neutrals that transformed a lawful agreement into one of a sec-
ondary nature.21 2
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist attacked the rules as an unlawful viola-
tion of the plain language of section 8(b)(4)(B) and chastised the union for
attempting to coerce third party neutrals through concerted action "to ma-
nipulate the allocation of resources in our economy" in the name of work
preservation.21 3 He reasoned that decisions beginning with National Wood-
work had extrapolated too broadly from the legislative history of sections
8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e) to find support for the primary-secondary distinction.214
Justice Rehnquist did not recognize, as the majority did, that work preserva-
tion agreements were categorized as primary activity and thus exempted
from the secondary boycott proscriptions in sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). 215
Justice Rehnquist disputed the Court's acceptance of the work preserva-
tion/work acquisition distinction as a basis for determining the legality of
agreements, and he perceived the Court's approval of the doctrine to be a
panacea for a union whose jobs were merely threatened.216 He contended
that the Court's focus on ILA work, and its unwillingness to consider extra-
unit effects, appeared contradictory because a determination of work acquisi-
tion should concentrate, to some degree, on the work being acquired.2 7 He
asserted that permitting such agreements in the name of work preservation
any work." Counsel stated that this "oxymoronic dilemma" could not be corrected by assert-
ing that ILA work had been inextricably integrated into off-pier work and hence "eliminated."
Brief in Opposition to Petitioner at 10, ILA-II.
210. 105 S. Ct. at 3057 (quoting 266 N.L.R.B. at 249).
211. Id. at 3056.
212. Id. at 3057. See also Brief in Opposition to Petitioner at 15, ILA-HI. "When the
retained work bears a functional and historical relationship to the traditional unit work, the
agreement has a primary work preservation objective ... [and] does not lose that character
merely because the retained work may also be related to the traditional work of others." Id.
213. 105 S. Ct. at 3060 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 3060-61.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 3061-62.
217. Id. at 3061.
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could result in duplicative work. Additionally, Justice Rehnquist agreed
with Justice Burger that the union's activities "may render change so diffi-
cult, by artificially raising the costs of a new system, that they stifle techno-
logical advance."
218
Justice Rehnquist discounted the collective bargaining process as a solu-
tion to the economic problems raised by union work preservation clauses,
principally because "if private ordering were sufficient to alleviate all labor
problems then there would be no need for labor laws." '2 19 Furthermore, he
stated that by enacting sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), Congress intended to
prohibit certain types of union conduct regardless of potential resolution
through the collective bargaining process.22°
Finally, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority's emphasis on the work
preservation process because it invited the union to extend its influence be-
yond the traditional issues involved in a primary labor dispute to neutrals
"who participate in the employer's markets., 221 By suggesting "that the
natural tendency of the Rules will be to bring the truck terminals and ware-
houses to the pier," he stated that the rules effectively constituted the illegal
secondary activity envisioned by legislative enactment of sections 8(b)(4)(B)
and 8(e).222 Thus, Justice Rehnquist contended that the objective of the
rules was to obtain work not traditionally performed by longshore labor, and
hence, they constituted impermissible activity under the Act.2 23
IV. THE EFFECT OF ILA-II: REINFORCING LAWFUL WORK
PRESERVATION PRINCIPLES
The Court's decision in ILA -II is consonant with the line of reasoning that
extends from the enactment of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e). The decision
reinforced the entrenched legislative and judicial concept that the provisions
were designed to reach only secondary objectives.224 This proposition has
been judicially accepted and is well grounded in case law initiating with the
National Woodwork decision.22 5
Second, the primary-secondary nature of the activity is readily ascertain-
able when examining work preservation agreements. Even prior to the Na-
tional Woodwork decision, the NLRB frequently examined work
218. Id. (quoting ILA-I, 447 U.S. at 526-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 3062.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 3063.
224. Id. at 3057. See also supra notes 31, 49, 50, and accompanying text.
225. 105 S. Ct. at 3057.
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preservation clauses and developed manageable criteria for their enforce-
ment, recognizing that a union could engage in lawful work preservation
without running afoul of the secondary boycott proscriptions of the Act.22 6
Furthermore, some courts of appeals emphasized that incidental secondary
effects on a neutral employer would not transform a legitimate clause into
impermissible union activity.2 27
The work preservation doctrine gained approval in the National Wood-
work decision. There, the Supreme Court recognized the legitimacy of union
goals to maintain certain work, so long as the parameters of work preserva-
tion did not extend beyond the bargaining unit to monopolize jobs because
they were non-union.22" Even with subsequent development of intermodal
containerization and the collectively-bargained rules, courts have consist-
ently recognized that accommodation of the longshore unions was effectively
dictated by case law in the work preservation arena. 229 For instance, the
first decision in the area of containerization, International Container Corpo-
ration, recognized that the rules remained outside the secondary boycott
proscriptions and were a proper union stronghold. 230 ILA-I affirmed the
appropriate guidelines that conformed to the primary-secondary distinc-
tion.23 1 The principles enunciated in ILA-I were reinforced by the Court in
ILA-II, where the Court clarified the relevant focus necessary to justify the
longshore union's desire to maintain "traditional" work.232 The Court con-
comitantly emphasized that such agreements were intended to elude the
grasp of section 8(e), at least where their design lies in the "bona fide" pri-
mary activity of affecting labor relations of the bargaining-unit employees'
work which the agreement sought to preserve.23 3 Consequently, section
8(e), which did not enlarge the type of conduct outlawed by section
8(b)(4)(B), 234 was essentially designed to exclude such bona fide agreements.
Third, the Court's reasoning was sound in rejecting the NLRB's concern
with the extra-unit effects of shortstopping truckers and traditional
warehousers.2 35 The Board's focus had virtually ignored previous judicial
determinations that a valid work preservation clause was not transformed
into prohibited secondary activity merely due to a collateral impact on third
226. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 166-83 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
233. 105 S. Ct. at 3055-56.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 3056.
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parties. 16 That was precisely the logic employed by the Court in ILA-I in
directing the Board to focus on the work of the bargaining-unit employees as
the proper work in dispute.237 The AiU found an unlawful work acquisition
objective on the grounds that the work of truckers and warehousers did not
derive from containerization, and that the ILA had secondary objectives in
seeking to compensate for losses at the expense of inland employees.2 38 This
defeated the essential aspect of the Court's directive. Since the rules were
designed to retain only the work of loading and unloading cargo at the
2391eBad'pier, the Board further convoluted the analysis by rearranging the focus
to include non-bargaining work in the calculation. This reasoning, afortiori,
foreclosed any possibility of finding valid work preservation objectives relat-
ing to the longshore work performed at the pier.
The importance of the work preservation doctrine lies in recognizing that
the permissible aspect of the doctrine was measured by focusing on the bar-
gaining unit work as it currently existed. 2 ° It was unreasonable to assume,
therefore, that by hypothetically altering the situs of the trucking and ware-
housing work, as Justice Rehnquist did in his dissent, the ILA bargaining
unit essentially would appropriate the work at the pier. The majority rea-
soned that the work preservation doctrine required emphasis on the work in
dispute as a legitimate and reasonable mechanism for delineating the pri-
mary objectives of the union.24 This, in effect, was the method of "relevant
inquiry under §§ 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e)" defined by the Court.2 4 2 Artificial ad-
justments in the majority's analysis, as proposed by the dissent, distorted the
purpose of the doctrine-that purpose was to identify and define the legiti-
mate scope of work preservation by focusing on the bargaining unit tradi-
tionally performing the work.
The decisions rendered prior to enactment of section 8(e) also lend sup-
port to the work preservation doctrine. For instance, although in Sand Door
the Supreme Court held that an employer-voluntary hot cargo clause was
not a defense to an unfair labor practice, it did not condemn the enforcement
of hot cargo clauses per se so long as a choice was "available to the secon-
dary employer notwithstanding any private agreement entered into between
the parties., 243 In enacting section 8(b)(4)(A) Congress intended to prevent
the coercion of neutral employers through the inducement of their employ-
236. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
237. 447 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
238. 105 S. Ct. at 3051 (citing 266 N.L.R.B. at 235-36).
239. 266 N.L.R.B. at 237.
240. 105 S. Ct. at 3056.
241. Id. at 3056-57.
242. Id. at 3057.
243. 357 U.S. at 105. The Court stated: "Certainly the voluntary observance of a hot cargo
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ees. 2" Although Congress recognized that the Sand Door decision left a
loophole that needed to be closed,24 5 conduct prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(A) was not expanded by the proscriptions of section 8(e).246
Finally, the Supreme Court in ILA-II recognized that displacement of
traditional jobs through evolving technological innovation did not make use-
less the work the rules sought to preserve.2 47 In directing the NLRB to
determine whether a valid work preservation clause existed, the Court in
ILA-I stated that the determination should be "informed by an awareness of
the congressional preference for collective bargaining as the method for
resolving disputes over dislocations caused by the introduction of technolog-
ical innovations in the workplace. '2 48 The Court in ILA-II reinforced a
preference for collective bargaining by cautioning the parties to "eschew a
resolution" primarily based on economic predilections, and to find one based
on congressional intent.24 9 Consequently, unless Congress unequivocally ex-
cludes collective bargaining as an appropriate resolution and demonstrates
an exclusive preference for the legislative mechanism, the Court will not pre-
clude that option.25 ° Accordingly, because the work preservation doctrine
consistently affords a constant and stable framework, upon which both man-
agement and labor rely, adherence to the doctrine provides consistent gui-
dance for the parties.25 1
The underpinnings initially outlined in ILA-I and reinforced in ILA-H
dictated "negotiated compromise" as an attempted solution to the economic
problems precipitated by changing technology. In this case, the rules repre-
sented that compromise.25 2 Additionally, the negotiated compromise repre-
sented compliance with the major premise of our national labor laws; that is,
"to encourage the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 253 The
Court noted in ILA-I, and left intact in ILA-I, that in judging a collectively-
provision by an employer does not constitute a violation of § 8(b)(4)(A), and its mere execu-
tion is not ... prima facie evidence of prohibited inducement of employees." Id. at 108.
244. Id. at 100.
245. See supra notes 76, 87, and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
247. 105 S. Ct. at 3057-58. One of the arguments posited in ILA-I was that the rules were
"nothing less than an invidious form of 'featherbedding' to block full implementation of mod-
em technological progress." 447 U.S. at 526-27 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Accord Note, The
Rules on Containers: Work Preservation or Work Acquisition?, 14 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 453,
479-80 (1982). But see supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
248. 447 U.S. at 511.
249. 105 S. Ct. at 3058 (quoting National Woodwork 386 U.S. at 648-50).
250. Id. at 3057-58 (citing ILA-I, 447 U.S. at 526-27).
251. Id. at 3058.
252. Id. at 3058-59.
253. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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bargained agreement the inquiry should not focus on whether the rules were
a "rational or efficient response to innovation," but whether they were a
permissible mechanism directed toward a reasoned response to the preserva-
tion of jobs.2" 4
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. International
Longshoremen 's Association (ILA-II) held that the collectively-bargained
longshore Rules on Containers were a lawful work preservation agreement
that lacked impermissible secondary objectives.
In enacting federal labor law, Congress intended to accommodate the in-
terests of both employers and unions by eliminating economic pressure ex-
erted on employers. At the same time, it intended to recognize labor's
legitimate interest in negotiating conflicts through the collective bargaining
process. The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to federal la-
bor law proscribe classic secondary boycott situations in which a union ex-
erts pressure against an employer not a direct party to a labor dispute, as
distinguished from legitimate pressure exerted against a primary employer.
Judicial analysis of work preservation clauses initiated with the establish-
ment of union primary versus secondary activity resulting from the examina-
tion of section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act.
Consequently, judicial interpretations of the secondary boycott provisions
recognized that they were intended to reach only secondary activity, and
that collateral impact on neutral employers would be acceptable. Hence,
these decisions reinforced the congressional purpose to shelter only truly
neutral employers from the reach of union pressure.
Beginning with Conway's Express, courts have emphasized this primary/
secondary dichotomy in considering collectively-bargained work preserva-
tion agreements, and have successfully utilized this test to define the proper
scope of the union's bargaining power. Nonetheless, Congress recognized
that, in holding that a hot cargo clause per se was not unlawful, the Sand
Door decision left a loophole in the secondary boycott proscriptions of fed-
eral labor law. The enactment of sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 8(e), strengthening
the secondary boycott provisions, still limited union pressure to unlawful
secondary activity. With the enactment of section 8(e), the NLRB devel-
254. 447 U.S. at 511. See also Ross, supra note 151, at 419. In positing the argument that
"[s]ociety's interests in technological progress are not necessarily incompatible with that of
unions," Ross states that the "optimum rate in which labor-saving technology is introduced is
not the fastest possible rate. To the extent that this is true, union impediments may be consid-
ered as not merely obstacles to progress, but as efforts to buy time in which the human costs of
change can be softened and made more tolerable." Id.
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oped manageable guidelines to define the scope of work preservation. The
landmark decision of National Woodwork, however, definitively established
the work preservation doctrine as the main criterion for determining legal
activity under section 8(e). Subsequent decisions have consistently recog-
nized that organized labor's attempts to preserve work traditionally per-
formed by unions constitute lawful work preservation.
Nonetheless, Congress could not have anticipated the myriad of problems
precipitated by evolving technological change in the shipping industry, in-
cluding the onset of intermodal containerization and the associated rules
designed to deal with the elimination of jobs. By enunciating the principles
announced in National Woodwork, however, the Supreme Court in ILA-I
directed the Board to consider all the surrounding circumstances in evaluat-
ing work preservation and to focus on the work of bargaining unit employees
in analyzing the rules. By instructing the Board to consider work preserva-
tion in the light of a massive technological change in the industry, the Court
directed an evaluation of the relationship between the work the union at-
tempted to preserve and the traditional work it had performed.
By focusing on the extra-unit effects of workers outside the bargaining
unit, the Court in ILA-II recognized that the Board had effectively fore-
closed an opportunity for work preservation for longshore labor. The Court,
in stating that the union was motivated by a desire to preserve jobs despite
diminishing cargo work at the pier, justifiably held that the rules evidenced a
primary objective and did not encompass impermissible union pressure on a
neutral employer.
The Supreme Court's decision in ILA-II reinforced an ongoing attempt to
rationally accommodate the interests of both unions and employers by rec-
ognizing the legitimate parameters of the work preservation doctrine in-
formed by the collectively-bargained rules. Because both management's and
labor's reliance on the doctrine is firmly established, continued support for
resolution of the problems precipitated by technological change is war-
ranted. Manageable guidelines in the bargaining process, reinforced by the
Court in ILA-II, foster the goal of national labor policy-to resolve dispute
through the collective bargaining mechanism.
Nancy M. Rappa
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